身边的经济学·社会常识英语30篇（2）

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信号理论：教育作为可信信号

Employers cannot directly observe job applicants' ability, so they rely on observable signals.
A college degree often serves as a costly and hard-to-fake indicator of diligence and intelligence.
Signal credibility depends on the difficulty of obtaining the credential without possessing the trait.
Degrees from selective institutions carry stronger signaling weight due to admission rigor.
Alternative credentials like coding bootcamps face skepticism until labor-market outcomes prove reliability.
Over-education can occur when employers raise degree requirements beyond what tasks actually require.
Credential inflation makes degrees less distinctive unless paired with relevant experience.
Signals work best when they correlate strongly with future job performance.
Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.
Understanding this clarifies why hiring practices persist despite rising tuition costs.