身边的经济学·社会常识英语30篇（2）
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Signaling Theory: Education as a Credible Signal
信号理论：教育作为可信信号
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Employers cannot directly observe job applicants' ability, so they rely on observable signals.
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A college degree often serves as a costly and hard-to-fake indicator of diligence and intelligence.
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Signal credibility depends on the difficulty of obtaining the credential without possessing the trait.
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Degrees from selective institutions carry stronger signaling weight due to admission rigor.
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Alternative credentials like coding bootcamps face skepticism until labor-market outcomes prove reliability.
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Over-education can occur when employers raise degree requirements beyond what tasks actually require.
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Credential inflation makes degrees less distinctive unless paired with relevant experience.
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Signals work best when they correlate strongly with future job performance.
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Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.
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Understanding this clarifies why hiring practices persist despite rising tuition costs.