身边的经济学·社会常识英语30篇（2）

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信号理论：教育作为可信信号

Employers cannot directly observe job applicants' ability, so they rely on observable signals.
A college degree often serves as a costly and hard-to-fake indicator of diligence and intelligence.
Signal credibility depends on the difficulty of obtaining the credential without possessing the trait.
Degrees from selective institutions carry stronger signaling weight due to admission rigor.
Alternative credentials like coding bootcamps face skepticism until labor-market outcomes prove reliability.
Over-education can occur when employers raise degree requirements beyond what tasks actually require.
Credential inflation makes degrees less distinctive unless paired with relevant experience.
Signals work best when they correlate strongly with future job performance.
Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.
Understanding this clarifies why hiring practices persist despite rising tuition costs.

听 → 读 → 学表达 → 懂 → 今天会说这一句 → 跟读录音 → 自己说一句。

Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building. 政府教育补贴可能无意中强化信号功能而非技能培养。
Credential inflation makes degrees less distinctive unless paired with relevant experience. 文凭通胀使学位失去区分度，除非辅以相关经验。
Signals work best when they correlate strongly with future job performance. 信号与未来工作表现高度相关时效果最佳。

这篇中文题目最接近哪一句？信号理论：教育作为可信信号一次学校运动会的通知一份超市购物清单

课文第一句的意思更接近？雇主无法直接观察求职者的能力，因此依赖可观察的信号。今天学校放假了。请把窗户打开。

这一课主要在讲什么？（看英文标题） Signaling Theory: Education as a Credible Signal How to cook noodles A maths worksheet

Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.

Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.

第一版：录下来、回听、再听标准音。系统打分以后再加。

用今天的表达，自己说一句。

例子：Government subsidies for education may unintentionally amplify signaling over skill-building.